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ABSTRACT

This report is intended to set forth some of the problems and
solutions involved in financing and regulating water quality control.
The purpose is to record some of the major problems confronting those
who legislate water quality, those who espouse technological answers,
and those who see the problem in terms of economic solutiona.

The

limits placed by political and institutional constraints on solutions
to these problems are fiequently not understandable.
Within this report are contained separate investigations:

a

study of federal-interstate relations and the interstate compact; a
study of Kentucky's common law approach to water rights; a study of
financing water quality under Kentucky statutes; and a summary and
analysis,

Each of these areas touches on problems involved in the

planning process; in this context, the following problems will be
considered:
development.

(1)

The availability of water.

(2)

(3) Water and the environment.

for water resource development.

Water and economic

(4) Responsibilities

(5) Legal framework for development.

(6) Financing water resource development.

(7) Political and institu-

tional constraints.

KEY WORDS (Descriptors)
Legislation, Legal Aspects, Financing, Water Law, Water Policy,
Water Resources Development
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A.

INTRODUCTION

Kentucky is more than 120 counties, it is an entire
state, shaped like a keyhole, that cuts across the mid-section
of Southeastern United States.

The major intrastate rivers flow,

primarily, into the Ohio River; three percent, or the remainder,
1
flow into the Mississippi River.
Water quality in Kentucky is an

natural and man-made consequences, and any water-use will affect
the quality of the water.

2

For our purposes, it is necessary to

point out that the soil conditions, themselves, as well as the
quantity of water available, contribute to the pollution of the
waters, because of the limestone formations which contribute to the
alkalinity of the water.3 Hovevei; the basic source of pollution
affecting water quality is man-made; municipal, rural, industrial,
or agricultural pollution caused by man's activities.,.
Municipal pollution is the accumulation of domestic wastes.
To this category can be added industrial wastes

- normally created

in the washing, cooling, flushing, and chemical treatment processes
employed by industry. 5

Industrial processes can be made more costly

1

Water.

Kentucky. Department of Natural Resources. Division of
Kentucky Water Resources Program Summary, P• 5.
2
Ibid., P• 11.
3Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5Jbid.,

P• 12.
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when doaeetic eevage deteriorate• the quality of the water need in
1111U1nfacturina:1 domeetic water enppliea, fishlife, and plant life
-y be harmed by the chemical and thermal pollution created by
indnetrial vastes, 6 In Kentucky, agricultural run-off and excessive
uee of chemical fertilizers add to the over-all vater quality
problem. 7 Moreover, in certain parte of the state, mine drainage
8
adde to the over-all water quality problem,
It must be remembered that water resources control and
- --development h-a combination of supply, qua-lity,--flood control~,-navigation, power generation, and recreation. 9 Water resources are
a combination of precipitation, rivers and streams, and ground water
enpply, and the hydrologic cycle doee not divide water into the neat
legal categories based upon the claesification or 1tat•a of the
ueer or of the water. 10 In Kentucky, water resource development as
a part of the planning procese has been divided into numerous departaents so that little can be done unless coordination and control is
1uperimposed on the extra framework.

The Kentucky Framework Water Plan

lists seven major agencies as dealing with water resource problems;
the Water Resources Authority of Kentucky, which maintains a planning
function; the Department of Natural Resources; the Kentucky Water
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9Ibid., P• 23,
10Morse, "The Cost of Purity1 Use of the Effluent Charge in
Water Quality Control and Management," 7 Valparaiso U, Law Rev. 170
(1973),
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Pollution Control Comaisaion; the Department of Mines and Minerals!
the Public Service Comaiasion; the Department of Agriculture; and
the Kentucky Port and River Development Comnission. 11 To this list
can be added the Department for Natural Resources and Enviro-ntal
Protection and the Kentucky Pollution Abatement Authority. 12 The
over-all structure of Kentucky water resources developnent bas become
a multilayered bureaucracy that vitally undercuts any attempt to
seriously consider rationalizing the creation of a centralized water
. --resources develoPJll.en!_@d control program.
State development in the water resources area has been directed
toward replacing multilayered bureaucracy and outdated legislation
with an entire code that deals with water resource• develoiment and
control in one package. 13 One example of such a code is the Model
Water Code authored by Maloney. Ausnesa. and Morris• and recently
14
adopted by the State of Florida.
The Code• itself, is baaed upon
a n11111ber of existent state plans and covers every area of water
11

Kentucky. Department of Natural Resources. Division
of Water. Kentucky Water Resourcee Program. p. 36-40.
12Governor Wandel Ford reorganized the environmental resources
programs in 1973. creating a Department for Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection. (The Courier-Journal• Thursday• January••
1973), Confirmed by Senate Bill 112, Section 15. 197• Kentucky General
As~embly, effective June 21. 1974.
13see, Morse, "A Model Water Code," Book Review. 62 Kentucky
Lav J. 289 (1973-74); Maloney and Ausness. "Administering State Water
Resources: The Need for Long-Range Planning•" 73 W. Va. Lav Rev. 209
(1971).
1~loney. Auaness, and Morris. A Model Water Code. Gainesville• Fla.; U. of Florida Press• 1972.
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re•ource• as ¥1111 as creating a two-tiered admini•trative etructure
compr6•ed of a State Water Resource• Board and regional water manage..nt districts, 1 5 Chapter one deals with the administrative structure;
chapter two createa a pennit system for regulating consU111ptive uses of
water; chapter three provides for well construction standards and
licenaing; chapter four regulates dam construction, impoundaenta, and
appurtenant worka; chapter five covera water quality, including a
- - - --water -quality-plan,-construetion and cliacharge-permi-ts,-and-enfol'Oement-tools; and the final chapter is on, weather modification,

16

The phil-

osophy of the Model Code is expreased in the declaration of policy
1

vhich ia to plan and develop adequate water resources for the State. 7
Our interest in this report is with Chapter 5, Water Quality;
however, there is no denying the fact that dealing with the problem of
water pollution control in a pie1mmeal effort without attacking the
entire problem of water resource developnent and control is a wasteful and, perhaps, futile venture,

Kentucky needs not only a permit

system and a means for regional integration of pollution control
facilities, it also needs a comprehensive structure of legal authority
for development and enforcement,

The imposition of two or three more

laws onto an already overburdened bureaucracy will only serve as a
i5Cbapter 1, Administrative Structure and Operation; See,
Morse, "Model Water Code," supra,, at p, 292,

16Tbe incluaion of weather modification and the ollission of
agricultural spraying is to be questioned; however weather modification
is a little regulated activity while agricultural spraying receives both
state and federal attention, §!!!., Morse, "Model Water Code," supra.,
at 295,

17Sec, 102, Declaration of Policy.
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temporary solution to a problem that demands an overhaul, not a
repair job.

Water Quality Control Under a Permit System

The Federal Yater Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 set
forth tvo provisions applicable to the states that are releT&Dt to
this discussion.

Title II--Grants for -the Construction of Treat-

ment Works18 and Title IV--Permita and Licenaes. 19 Title II,
Section 201 (e) states, "The Administrator shall encourage waate
treatment management which results in integrating facilities for
sewage treatment and recycling with facilities to treat, dispose of,
or utilize other industrial and municipal wastes, including but not
limited to solid waste and waste heat and thennal discharges.

Such

integrated facilities shall be designed and operated to produce
revenues in excess of capital and operation and maintenance costs
and such revenues shall be used by the desinated regional unagement
agency to aid in financing other environmental improvement programs."
Section 201 (g) allows payment to, "any state, mnnicipality, or
intermunicipal or interstate agency ••• "

Section 204:

and Conditions, Subsection {b) states, "(1)

Limitations

Notwithstanding any

other provisions of this title, the Administrator shall not approve
any

grant for any treatment vorks under section 201 (g)(1) after

1BP. L. 92-500.

(October 18, 1972).

19P. L. 92-500.

(October 18, 1972).
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Karch 1, 197J, unleH he ehall fir11t have determined that the applicant
(a) has adopted or will adopt a system of charges to assure that each
recipient of waste treatment eervices within the applicant's jurisdiction, as detenained by the Adminietrator, will pay its proportionate
share of the costs of operation and maintenance (including replacement)
of any waste treatment services provided by the applicant; (b) has made
provision for the payment to such applicant by the industrial users of
---- --the--treatment -works -of-that -portion of the cost-of-construction-of~-~ -such treatment works (asdeti:nained by the Administrator) which is
allocable to the treatment of such industrial wastes to the extent
attributable to the Federal share of the cost of construction; and
(c) has legal, institutional, managerial, and financial capability
to insure adequate construction, operation, and maintenance of
treatment works throughout the applicant's jusidiction, aa
by the administrator.

(2)

determined

The administrator shall, within one

hundred and eighty days after the date of enactment of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972, and after consultation with appropriate state, interstate, municipal, and intermunicipal agencies, issue guidelines applicable to payment of waste treatment costs by industrial and nonindustrial recipients of waste treatment services which shall establish (a) classes of users of such
services, including categories of industrial users:

(b) criteria

against which to determine the adequacy of charges imposed on classes
and categories of users reflecting all factors that influence the
cost of waste treatment, including strength, volume, and delivery
flow rate, characteristics of waste; and (c) model systems and rates
of user charges typical of various treatment works serving municipal

-6-

industrial co11m11Diti&B,

(3)

The grantee shall retain an amount of

the revenues derived from the payment of coats by industrial users of
wa•te treat.ment services, to the extent coats are attributable to the
Federal share of the eligible project coats provided pursuant to this
title as determined by the Administrator equal to (a) the amount of
the non-Federal cost of such project paid by the grantee plus (b) the
amount, determined in accordance with regulations proaalgated by the
- - ---Adminiatrator,-neceasary for future expansion_and__recons:truc:tion_of___ _
the project, except that such retained amount shall not exceed 50
percentum of such revenues from such project.

All revenues from such

project not retained by the grantee shall be deposited by the Administrator in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

That portion of

the revenues retained by the grantee attributable to clause (b) of
the first sentence of this paragraph, together vi th any interest
thereon shall be used solely for the purposes of future expansion and
reconstruction of the project.

(4)

Approval by the administrator of

a grant to an interstate agency established by interstate compact for
any treatment works shall satisfy any other requirements that such
works be authorized by Act of Congress."
It is apparent that under the F, W. P. C, A. charges are
required and that those charges are to be based upon the services
received by the users,

This requirement will be discussed at length

with references to Kentucky; however it is necessary first to point
out the relationship of this provision to Title IV.
Licenses.

Permits and

Section 402 of the 1972 amendments governs the national

permit program which provides for state permit programs complying with
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the requireaenta of Title IV; diacharge of any pollutant without
a perai t h illegal, and the permi ta cannot be given unle811 the
propoaed permit holder agree• to comply with effluent limitations
regarding point dhchargea, nev sources, toxic substances, and
pretreatment. 20
The permit system replaces the Refuse Act of 189921 program;
althouah enforcement authority under that Act for certain diachargea
_ilaJ1_he,_11_mai11tDi11ed by the federal govel"Dm!lnt._~__}tha_t_ia_impol':ton_t___ _
to underatand is the scopt! of the definition of navigable waters

to which the permit program applies.

Senate Report No. 92-1236

accompanying P.L. 92-500 stated that navigable waters should be given
the broadest constitutional interpretation possible and cited Court
history aa moving from navigation in fact to a theory based on interatate commerce. 2 3 Subsequently the Environmental Protection Agency
2

°irannacone, Cohen, Davison. Envirolllllllltal Rights and
Remedies. 1973 Supp. Vol. 1 Rochester, N.Y.: Lavyers• Co-op Pub.
Co., 1973.
21

33 u. s. c. 407.

223 Environmental Law Reporter. Current Developaenta 1230
(Feb, 9, 1973) 40 C.F.R, Sec. 125,42 (a} 38 Fed. Reg. 13540 (May 22,
1973), states that discharges made without a pt!rmit issued under
Sec. 402 of the FWPCA 1972 or in violation of permit terms and conditions may result in institution of proceedings under the Refuse Act.

40 C.F.R, Sec. 125.42 (b) states that mere filing of an application
for a Sec. 402 permit will not preclude legal action for violation
of the Refuse Act, The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA states that no
new litigation under the Refuse Act will be instituted until Dec. 31,
1974, or until final administrative action baa been taken on permit
applications under 1972 Act, whichever is sooner. The 1972 amendments
do not affect pt!Dding litigation under the Refuse Act. U.S. v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chea, Corp, ,_u.s._; 5 Environmental Reporter,
1332, 1333 n, 2 (1973) Kentucky had not yet submitted a program acceptable
to the federal government as of this Yriting.

23s, Report 92-1236 accompanying P.L. 92-500, p. 144,
-8-

releaeed a "Memo to the Regional Office• on the Meaning of the Tena
'MaTigable Waters,'" which steted that the tena referred to, •(1)
all naTigable vaters of the United Stetes; (2)
navigable vaters of the United Stete•1 (J)

Tributeries of

Interstete vaters; (4)

Intrastete lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized by interatete travellers for recreational and other purpose•; (5)

Intra-

etate lakes, rivers, and streams from where fish or ehellffeh are
--- --- -taken and sold in interstete comerce; (6)

Interetate__lakes, __ rinrs, __ _

and streams which are utilized for industrial purposes by industries
in interstate comerce.• 24 In fact, the definition covers, "th•
vaters of the United States including territerial seaa,• and cover•
eny activities, including sewerage facilities which might affect

vater quality. 25
The Environmental Protection Agency bas issued guideline•
stating the requirements for a state permit program under the national
permit program. 26 Pursuant to these regulations, the Council of
24 4 Environmental Law Reporter 46318; 40 C.F.R. 125.1 fp)1
38 Fed. Reg. 13527, May 22 1 1973; as amended by J8 Fed. Reg. 17999,
July 5, 1973, and J8 Fed. Reg. 19894, July 24, 1973.
25s. Report 92-1236, p. 144.
26sec. J04 (h) (2) of the FWPCA of 1972 sets forth the
procedures; 40 C.F,R. Part 124; 37 Fed. Reg. 28390 (Dec. 22, 1972);
j Environmental Law Reporter, Current Developments 1266 (Feb. 16,
1973) amended j Environmental Law Re orter. Current Developments
1447 (March JO, 1973 . See, "Memo of E.P.A. Deputy Acting Adlllinistrators Regarding the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems
Permit," 3 Environmental Law Re orter. Current Developments 339
(June 29, 1973; letter of E.P.A. Administrator to State Governors
on legislation needed to carry out National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems, j Environmental Reporter. Current Developments.
985 (Dec. 22, 1972).
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State Govel'IIJlenta adopted a Model Law to Enable States to Participate
in the National Discharge Elimination System. 27 ('llhich will be
discussed below)
The combination of the requireaenta in Title II for recovering
uHr charge a and the imposition in Title IV of a permit ayatea upon
di•charges into all waters of the United States necessitates that
Kentucky implement a Program acceptabll to the E. P. A. to qualify
- for-federal funding -for-construction of aeverage-faci-1-i-ties.--Th._____ _
existing state legislation provides for implementation of the prog1'11111a, and it is only the utilization of these statutory powers to
construct a program that is necessary, inaofar as the user charges
and financing ia concemed.

As for a permit system, it would appear

that the Model State Law proposed by the Council of State Governments

an acceptable vehicle for briqi.. the state into compliance Yi th
federal legislation. 28

h

It is, of course, the contention of the writers that a major overhaul of Kentucky's natural resource legislation is the real solution
and that serious thought should be given by the legislature to adopting a Model Water Code 29 in lieu of patchwork attempts to restructure
the present legislative structure.

Such a solution would enable the

state to coordinate its water planning ae to consumption, quality, and
27"Model Law to Enable States to Participate in the National
Pollution Elimination System Established Under the 1972 ~ . "
(Council of State Governments, Feb. 1973) Environmental Law Reporter.
State Water Laws 611.0101.
28

Ky. Rev. Stat. 224. 06o.

2
9see, Maloney, Ausness, and Morrie, supra.
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•••• tor Tario•• coaflicti111 alternative• auch ae domaatic conaumption,
in4uatry, recraation, na'l'igation, an4 agriculture.
ob'l'io•• that total reform must
exiatins tramevvrk.

,1..,. -y to

However, it h

needed COIIJ>liance within the

The uaer char1e• 4iecuased below are applicable

Yi thin Kentucky'• exhtina; lea;ialation. :,o

The -del pel'lllit ayatem

could be implemented through Section 221.010 of the Kentucky Re'l'iaed
Statute•, as vae Regulation WP-1 on Kentucky Waste Discharge Pe:nrlt
regulations ueued on January 8, 1957)1
Integrating these efforts into regional or interstate programs
could be accomplished through the exiating interstate compact,'2 and
the regional organizations of an intraatate nature in Kentucky.·
Horeo....r, Section 20li, quoted above specifically provides for approval
by the administrator of grants to interstate agencies established by
interstate compacts in Section 20li (b) (,).''
This report cannot, however, stress too greatly the need for a
thorough revision of Kentucky's entire -ter resource planning an4
reco!lllllend that (1) a thorough review be -de ot atatutes that pertain
to -ter resources; (2) responsibility for water resource, be centralized and coordinated; (3) a state water plan be developed; (1) the
legal status of users and the legal categories of -ter uaes be redefined; (5) a permit system for both the consumption and quality of
30see, text,~·
31Attached as appendix.

(Regulation WP-1)

32 See, footnote 131, infra.

3\.L. 92-500.
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water be introducedJ and (6) a codification of all lava pertaining to
water resources be undertaken,3%
It ia the limited purpose of this report to set forth a 11.ethod
of utilising the Kentucky framework to implement certain progrsms
necessary for compliance with federal legislation and to do so in an
efficient manner that will best allocate available resources,

Our

contention is that the combination of user charges and the permit
--sy-.tem-wi thin- a-regional organization iDVQlving-both-intrastate______ _
and interstate facilities will be the moat economic and efficient
method of undertaking compliance with the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.

We will proceed to discuaa the economics of uaer charge

ll)"Btem within the Kentucky framework and then will proceed with a
diacuasion of a possible model law and regulations to imple11.ent the
system,

Water,

3"xentucky. Department of Natural Resources,
Kentucky Framework Water Plan, p, 1-21.
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Division of

B.

THE f.qUITY ARD ECONOMIES OF STATE

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FINANCING
State Compliance With the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Ameudllents of 1972: The Value of the Effluent Charge in
Kentucky.
At beBt, in attelllJ)ting to eolTe the problem of water pollution
politician• search for the right bureaucracy, bureaucrats persist in
__ t.ll!i!" _se_emingly endleaa queet for the "right" set of rnlea and regulatione, ,mile engineers continue their ecientific bunt for that
tventietb century .American miracle:

the technological fis.

A.a

important as government interdiction, efficient administration, and
applied technology -y all be in dealing with the problem of water
pollution they are all bound by themselvea to have disappointing
reeulte.
Politics, law,and technology can constitute by themselves only
the framewok and method by which nny given solution is to be implemented. Although they are of course, the necessary flesh of any
workable solution's bones, they are not the substantive bones of any
solution.

This basic fact, though, is too often overlooked and as a

result the two primary and fundamental aspects of water pollution control
are ignored in the process.

The problem of water pollution control

is in substance an economic problem35 involving social coats.J6 This
J5See Hite, Macaulay, Stepp aud Yandle, Jr., The Economies of
Environmental Quality (1972); See also Kneese and Bower, Managing Water
Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions
(1968).
:
36ituff,"The Economic Common Sense of Pollution~ The Public Interest,
Spring, 69 (1970).
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etud:y therefore coneider1 the financing of water quality control and
management 1yetema with regard to theae two key aspects of the
pollution problem.
The framework for analysis is the passage of enabling legislation l7
by the Kentucky General Assembly in order that Kentucky might comply Yi th

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.'8 In the
role of "devil I s advocate" this report takes a critical look at the

~ newly cuated Kentucky Po~llution Abatement At1:t~or!-tY'':~~and the financing scheme 40 it proposes to use in generating state revenue for
procuring matching federal funds.

Theee federal matching grants will

be used for construction of sewerage treatment facilities by local
water treatment districts in Kentucky in compliance with the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendment• of 1972~1 Since this Act is
undoubtedly the most ambitious and encompassing legislation in the
area of water purity to date, enabling state legislation in compliance
with federal law deserves to be carefully scrutinized.

Under federal

37Kentucky Acts 1972 ch. 329. Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereinafter referred to as K.R.S. ch. 224A. H.B. 560 effective June 21, 1974,
amendud K.R.S. 224 to include county and urban county govermaents, to
make the reference to the water pollution control agency to the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and to incorporate the necessity for compliance ~-ith the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972; no substantive changes were made,
38Pub. L. No. 92-500 ( Oct, 18, 1972.
)
39K.R.S. ch. 224A.
40K.R.s. ch. 224A §§ 6, 19, 20.

' 1Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972).
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law 1reat latitude in the aubatantiTe aapects of regulation 1111.d
fi111111ciag ha• been left to atate diacretion.

la2

It i• hoped that

thi• broad diacuaaion of the equity 1111.d economies of water pollution
control financina generally 1111.d the critique of the Kentucky caae
1pecifically will shed some light on how this discretion may be used
Yi•ely.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 require
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the
United Stat..s be eliminated by 1985 •.laJ Provision is -de in the Act
for gr1111.ta to the states for construction of waste water treatmaat
works,"

This provision states in part that:

waste water treatment management plans 1111.d practices shall
provide for the application of the beat practicable vaate
treatment technology before 1111.y discharge into receinng
waters, including reclaiming 1111.d recycling of water, and
confined disposal of pollutants so they will not migrate
to cause water or other environmental pollution and shall la
provide for consideration of advanced treat.aent techniques. 5
States under the Act are required to submit for federal approval water
quality standards and implementation plans based on point discharge
effluent limitations, 46 Moreover, Title II of the Act requires that
42 Ibid,,

§ 101 (b).

43 Ibid.,

§ 101 (a)(1),

44 Ibid.,

§§ 201-12,

45Ibid.,

§ 201 (b).

46Ibid,,
§§ 301-03.
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a system of charges be included in any project whereby users pay an
appropriate share of the costs of operatien and ..inteDaDce ef the
system before eny grant is approved, 47 These previsions aebe1rledge
tile i!!tregal problems of -ter quality aad ,naae-nt, .\8 accept cestbenefit criteria as a guideline for pollution goals'9 and require
the internalization of costs by the imposition of charges en water

'

users,50 The Act, however, though it esta\lishes llinimma federal
1
---standards and -guidel-inea that states -must -•t,~ -leaves-pr:lmary~-- ___ _
responsibility for implementation and adllinietration ef water quality
control systems to the individual state!!,

The impact ef the Act

depends then on continuing effective and f11Dctioaal state action,

State Financing of Water Quality Control Syat...

A great variety of financing ache-• are employed throughout
the United States in water quality control and IIIIUlal-nt systems,
The user charge is by far the most prevalent method of water quality
control financing to the extent that direct government appropriations
46Ib"d
1 • ' §§ ,01-03,
47Ibid,, §§ 201-12,
48senate Comm, on Public Works, Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, S, Rep, No, 92-41,, 92d, Cong,, 1st Seas, {1972),
49 Ibid,
50lbid,
5tPub, L, No, 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972) § ,03 (e)(3),
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are not considered a functional scheme of water quality control
financing.

The "user charge" has become more popular in recent

years due no doubt to its flexibility in raising sufficient revenues
to meet increasing expeditures for pollution control at the state
and local levels.5 2

It is now estimated that over 70 percent of

municipalities with populations of 5000 or over utilize such a system. 53
Moreover, as states enact legislation in order to comply with federal
law~b~tb th~ extensiveness of its use and degree of reliance upon it~
are likely to increase substantially.

This increase will no doubt

result from the amount of additional revenue needed by state and local
governments in remodeling existing water treatment facilities and in
construction of new plants.

Given these circumstances, the need arises

·
· user
·
of th e varying
cnarge f"1nanc1ng
sc h emes
f or care f u 1 cons1· derat1on
now employed in order that a functional derermination of their economic
efficiency and effect.tve cost impact can be made.

The following die-

cussion details the elements of various user charge financing schemes
employed throughout the country.
User charges are based on varying formulae.

Some municipalities

52Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, The Cost of
Clean Water And Its Economic Impact (1969). The report is in three
volumes. Volume I updates the Department of the Interior's 1968 cost
analysis, Volume II, appendix, provides summary data from the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration's municipal waste inventories of
1962 and 1968. Volume III, Sewerage Charges, discusses the financing
of wastewater collection systems and the considerations pertinent to the
selection of a user charge frogram by a local governmental unit as a
means of raising revenue, LHereinafter referred to as Cost of Clean
Water, J
53volume III, 12-2J.
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charge a flat monthly rate with no user classification differential,
Others employ a more complex formulae that might include not only a
classification according to type of user (industrial--household) but
also the number of plumbing fixtures and quantity of water purchased,
The list below-5

4

outlines the most widely employed methods of calcul-

ating user charges.
1.)

Flat rate method:

This financing scheme is used by the

_____ maj~1:i_ty of_ cities hav:ing a population of 5,000 or less; its advantage
is simplicity and where industry is slight and water uses are generally
uniform, as in small communities, it is greatly relied upon.

User

charges, however, show no functional correlation to pollution costs. 5 5
2,)

Modified flat rate:

This is a version of the flat rate

charge in which charges are adjusted according to the type of water
user,

Usually users are classified into residential, business, munici-

pal, and light and heavy industrial classes,5 6

3,) Water use method:

Here user charges are based on a per-

centage of the water bill, the volume of water used, or a combined
formula that includes both a se,;er and water charge,

This financing

scheme is frequently the method applied by large municipalities with

-7

industrial complexes,)

'

4
5 The listing is taken from Morse, "The Cost of Purity: Use
of the Effluent Char1'e in Weter Quality Control and Management,"
7 Valparaiso U. Law Ilev, 169 (1973),
55yolunte III, at 21.

56Jbi d., at 22-23,
57 Ibi<l., at

16-18.
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4.)

Plumbing fixtures:

Charges in tdis financing scheme are

based on the amount and type of fixtures employed by users.

It is

not conmonly used, and Texas may now be the only state where this
formula is applied.SS
5.)

Sewer connection and tap fees:

Almost all municipalities

have an initial minimal charge often labeled a connection or tap on
charge.

The method of calculating this charge varies with:

(a) the

-size -of-the-sewer- connection or water -meter,---fb}---the-locP.-tion-oi'-the
customer, and (c) the condition of the street.59
6.)

Joint treatment and industrial surcharges:

In recent years

the joint treatment of municipal and industrial wastes has greatly
expanded due to the growth of sanitary districts and industry's willingness to join municipal waste treatment systems.
be hased on four differrmt calculations:

Here surcharges may

a constant rate formula, a

quality-quantity formula, the California formula, and the Joint
Committee formula. 60

The constant rate formula is usually based on

water use or type of business and is similar to the user charge method
of calculating rates.
the

This financing scheme is often used because of

simplicity in administration.

61

The quality-quantity formula is increasingly being employed by

'

municipalities throughout the country.
58 Ibid., at 19-20.
59 Ibid., at 24-25.
60Morse, supra at 182-83.
61 Ibid.
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Taking into account the amount

and characteristics of the sewerage, costs are attempted to be allocated
among the actual polluters.
The California formula employs both flat rate charges and
quantity-quality charges and allows considerable geographical flexibility
in charge plans.

62

The Joint Committee formula is based on nonuser fees collected
through property taxes or special assessments and user fees assessable
-through_quali_ty_...qu,_anti,_ty_ formula. 6 3
The above listed financing schemes are in many respects meaningless in and of themselves.

In the abstract they tell little of

their effectiveness in solving either the "economic problem" of
pollution or the equitable problem of distributing social costs.
It is to the former question that this paper now turns.

The '~conomic Problem of Pollution

Pollution, as stated earlier, is essentially an economic
.
1·
·1 cos t s. 64 As an economic problem pollution
v1ng socia
problem 1nvo
results from a market imperfection in the pricing system.

Economists

62 Ibid.
6

3volume III, at 32.

64

see Ostrom, "The Water Economy and Its Organization; in
Politics, Policy, and Natural Resources )76-96 (D. Thompson ed •. 1972).

-20-

have long noted this imperfection which they refer to as an "external
economy." 65
The Salton Sea in Southern California for inatance
of the most productive inland fisheries in the country.

66

is one

Being fed

by water that flows through the heavy fertilized Imperial Valley,
its aquatic life is enhanced considerably as a result of the amounts
of plant nutrients deposited therein.

This situation represents an

- - example- of--" ex-ternal -economy ·-" 67 The fishers_in__the __ aea _reap_the__ _
benefits of fertilizer payed for by farmers in the valley.

The

economic problem is that the price system does not provide for
payment to the farmers by the fisherman.
While this may be a pleasant by-product of agriculture from
the fisheries viewpoint, the situation leads to a misallocation of
resources. 68 Farmers, acting econsmically, apply fertilizer until
the last 1 dollar worth of fertilizer produces 1 dollar worth of
crops.

Farmers do not take into account the effect of the fertilizer

on the yield of the fisheries.

Even though the next 1 dollar worth

of fertilizer would :would increase the yield of the fisheries by say
.05 cents and increase the farmer's crop yield by .98 cents and
thereby contribute more to the national output than it costs, it
would still not be applied by the farmer.
6

Less of the resource is

5see Dorfman, Robert, The Price System.
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
66

1bid.

67 Ibid.
681bid.
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Englewood Cliffs,

employed than would be ideal from the point of view of national
output.

This situation seems to hold generally wherever exteral

.
. t 69
economies
ezis.

Oysters of the Chesapeake Bay and the clam beds of Long
Island are, on the other hand, being endangered by polluted waters
from the cities and industries of the East. 70
example of an "enternal diseconomy."

This situation is an

Unfortunately, external "disecon-

-omi-es"- seem-to-be-far- more prevalent than-"-economies.-"-Traffic-con-- -gestion and air, noise, and water pollution are all instances of
external "diseconomies."

In all these cases, private economic actions

have deleterious side effects for which the perpretrator is not
charged but which nevertheless sometimes results in serious social
costs.

The defect is inherent in the price system where the guiding
principle is that each enterprise should bear the cost of the resources it employs, and no others, and should receive the benefits
of the goods it produces, and no others.

However, where sternal

diseconomies exist the price system does not in some cases transmit
the proper information or motivation for this principle to be able
to operate.

No charge is imposed by the price system on the firms

and cities for their damages to the coastal waters, or the industries
and activities dependent on pure water.
691bid.
?Olbid.
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Moreover, efficiency of the price system in resource allocation
depends on the identity of private and social costs.

So long as.every

producer compensates somebody for every cost imposed by his production,
his profit-maximizing decisions about how much to produce, and how, are
also socially efficient decisions of resource allocation.
and social costs are identical in such an instance.

Private

The water poll-

uting producer, however, is charged for some of the natural resources
. he .consumes, the capital he wears out, and thl!_labor_that he emplois __
but not for the cost of his polluting use of water.

Since his poll-

uting use harms others, the social cost is not zero as ia the private
cost of the producer's polluting use as an "unpaid for factor" 71 in
production.

The polluting use of water being cost free to the poll-

uter, the cost of the polluter's benefits derived therefrom are externalized on to society.

The producer's market price is left unaffected

by the cost of the polluting use.
The price system cannot take such effects into account. 72 Without prices to convey the needed information the polluting use as an
"unpaid for factor" in production results in profit-maximizing allocation of resources.

What appears to be needed is a regulatory system

whereby the resulting external cost of the polluting use is internalized.

If each polluting user ,rere made to bear the cost of his own

pollution, private and social costs would cease to be divergent and
the polluting user's decisions would in addition be socially efficient
decisions.

Moreover, polluters would seek out every available means

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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to reduce their polluting uae in order to reduce their own coat•,
Thia can be accomplished by putting a price on "polluting use,•
A price-based pollution control system would differ from the
ordinary transaction system only in that a regulatory agency would set
the prices, instead of their being set by demand-supply forces, and
that the state would force payment. 73

Under this system anyone could

emit pollution so long as the price set by the regulat0%7 authority,
-which-vould be the- marginal aocial cost of -that-pol-lu-ting-use,--•-- - ---paid.

Private decisions in this instance, though baaed on self-

interest, would be socially efficient decisions.
Since pollution is of many types and in varying degrees there
would naturally be different prices for different kinds and levels
of pollution.
tremely

Extremely dangerous polluting uses would have an ex-

high price, and in principle at least, the prices would vary

vith geographical location, season of the year, and even day of the
week, although too many variables might entail a prohibitive admint
· t ra t'1ve cos.
is

74

However, once these prices were set polluters could

adjust to them any way they chose to.

Acting out of self-interest they

would reduce pollution by every means possible and since everyone
would be charged the same price for the same type of pollution the
marginal cost of abatement vould be the same everywhere. 75
This self-regulating system necessitates the creation of a
73ituff, supra at 78,
74 Ibid. at 79,
75 Ibid,
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public administrative authority.

Its job would be to measure the

output of pollution from all sources, set the prices for pollution
costs, and serve as a central coordinating authority for cost-standards and federal-state relations.
In such a water pollution control and management system private
and social costs are identical.

Furthermore, the market would now

be effectively self-regulating enabling socially efficient maximizati,n
of resources.

In this system, were the cost of the "polluting use"

is internalized by the polluter, incentives are not destroyed but
rather enhanced since the development of new pollution control
methods will reduce the cost of pollution payments.

It might also

be easier to agree on a simple schedule of pollution prices than on
a complex set of administrative regulations.

This regulatory price-

system would also seem to insure a flexible and easily applicable
means for financing water pollution control and management systems.

Economies and User Charges

In considering the variety of financing schemes employed
throughout the United States it becomes apparent that most do not
operate so as to functionally internalize pollution costs.

User

charges as outlined earlier generally tend to charge not according to
the cost of polluting use but for use of water per se.

Charges based

on "'8tt!r use, flat rate, plumbing fixtures, and even modified flat
rate formulae are not functionally calculated so as to internalized
pollution costa,
In the joint treatment financing scheme \<here regulations
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normally control the types of waste that are acceptable in the treatment system, non-acceptable waste must be given pretreatment.

How-

ever, it appears that such regulations are not vigorously enforced?
with the result that industrial users are not charged full costs.

6

As.

a consequence, some municipalities incur large costs vhich are passed
on to local taxpayers and other users.
In all the user charge schemes of financing only the quality- - -- quantity- formula-seeks--to internalize the cost-of--the -"polluting-use-"·-- --Since this formula takes into account both the amount and characteristics of sewerage and allocates costs among the actual polluters, it
serves as an inducement to pretreatment and to red•cia& the quantity
of waste load.

Criteria for determining the kind and degree of poll-

ution in this financing scheme, however, are often crude classifications founded on no more than perhaps the old reliable "logical
guess." As one author states, "the method involves a total administrative scheme of testing, enforcement and calculation of treatment
charges vhich impedes its implementation in areas with inadequate
technical competence.?? Even in areas where such technical expertise
is available it is usually either ignored or underutilized.
Having suggested the internalization of costs in creating a
self-regulating price system as the "economic solution• to water
pollution this study now considers the non-economic question of
76Cost of Clean Water, Vol. I, supra at 10.
77Morse, supra at 182.

equity or fairness in distributing the social cost of pollution.

Equity in Water Pollution Control Financing

Theories of cost assessment vary in proportion to the degree
of emphasis placed on diverging or similar goals.

The theories of cost

assessment summarized below78 represent the major theories of allocating
costs in financing water pollution control and management systems in
the various states.
1.)

Public utility theory:

Sewage service is conc~ived as a

cononercial P.nterprise ~uch as the production of electricity.

Rates

are computed on the metered amount of water the user consumes ..nd the
most common method of assessment is a modified flat rate based on the
classification of the user (residential, industrial, business, IIIUJlicipjll)
and on the amount of use (not pollution).79

2.) Diffused benefits theory:

This theory assumes " "right

to pollute" and states that benefits are derived by all individuals,
inside and beyond the municipality, from the collection and treatment of sanitary sewage and industrial waste.

It takes all respon-

sibility away from the polluter and allocates costs among the federal,
80
state and local levels of goveTlllllent by general tax levies.
3.)

Added expenditure theory:

This theory holds that the

78 The Listing is taken from Morse, supra at 183-85,
79cost of Clean Water, Vol. II, supra at
SOibid.
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JS.

additional cost, once the primary function of the sewage system ia
determined (whether it be s~orm sewage or sanitary and business
the

It operates functionally much
81
like the public utility theory mentioned above.

sewage), should be cl.arged

4.)

to user.

Alternative revenue theory:

This procedure arrives at the

same result again as the public utility theory; it states that user
charges are more acceptable than increased property tall:es.
~·~

The theory

._looks toward the availa!>ility of revenue and .the ability ~.iml'l!se the
aost burden on the general public; it concludes that user charges are
more economically efficient than traditional methods of taxation as
well as being more acceptable to the public.

5.)

82

Capital and operation cost theory:

This the•ry assigns

capital costs to nonusers (property o'llllers who benefit from enhanced
property values) and operating costs to users (those who discharge
8
wastes into the system). 3
6.)

Differential benefits theory:

Here cost is di~ided in

proportion to benefits derived from the service (not from the polluting
use).

The theory would take away any direct responsibility for poll-

ution control from the creator of the waste.

It also involves numerous

complex evaluations, such as assessing the coat of recreational benefits
84
or the hypothetical loss incurred if there were no service.
81

Ibid at 39.

8 2.torse, supra at 184.
83 Ibid.
84 Cost of Clean Water, Vol. III, supra at 40-41.
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,'.) r...,

1

3tive use

.!.h!!!.iz~ The <1ystem is divided into parts

such as the collection system and the treatment plant system.

Costs

are then allocated on the basis of the volume of sewage flowing
through each part.

Nonusers would then be responsible for collection

costs (storm and infiltration water) and users would be responsible
8
for treatment of sewage. 5
8.)

Joint Committee theory:

This theory was formulated by

representatives _of_ eight national conmi ttees on wate;r _resourc_~e~~- ___ _
control.

It divides cost between property owners and users based on

annual fixed and operating costs.

Fixed costs are divided into coll-

ection, interception, ~umping rtation and plant categories.

The costs

are then allocated to user, storm water, future growth and infiltration
categories on the basis of volume and characteristics of severeg~.
Property is allocated the cost for future growth, infiltration and
storm water.

The same accounting methods are used for calculating

operating costs.

The property share is payable through special assess86
ments or property and the user share by user charges.
There are important distinctions to be drawn in dealing with tlle
economic question of pollution as opposed to the political question of
equity or fairness in distributing social costs.

A situation is said

to be economically efficient if it is not possible to rearrange things
8
so as to benefit one person without harming another. 7 Simply stated,
85 Ibid.at 41.
86
~

.at 41-45.

87see, Dorfman, Ro\Jert and Dorfman, Nancy., eds. f<'.:?'':'mi2s of.
the Environment, (New York, Norton,1972) for a number of <td:ini;ions of
Pare to Optilliality. All created to suit the writer's p,i.~·ticalar pciut
of view.
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I

~

that is the economic equation for efficiency.

But as Lawrence Ruff

points out "Politically, this equation can be solved in various -ys:
though most reasonable men will agree that efficiency is a good thing,
they will rarely agree about which of the many possible efficient
states, each with a different distribution of 'welfare' among individuals, is the best one."

88

Although economics itself has nothing to say about which
efficient state is best from the standpoint of equity and fairness,
this science can suggest ways of achieving efficient states that in
themselves functionally 1t0rk to-rds resolving a specific "economic"
problem.

In the end, the issue of equity is a matter of personal and

philosophical values destined to be resolved in the socio-political
process.

But economics can often quite accurately describe the equity

considerations involved in any suggested policy attempting to resolve
what is fundamentally an economic problem.
financing is an economic problem.

Water pollution control

As noted earlier, it results from

market imperfection in the price system.

Concisely stated, the

problem is that the "polluting use" of -ter is considered a "freegood."

And as the first principle of economics dictates, society must

pick up the tab for the polluters• "free lunch."

Polluters to some

extent merely pass on their internal "private costs" to society as
a vhole by externalizing them as "social costs."

The economic solution

lies in simply requiring that those who benefit by the polluting use
bear the burden of the cost of their polluting use.
This economic solution (internalization of costs) clearly
8

8rtuff, supra at 73.
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illustrates the equity considerations that are necessarily involved in
determining cost allocation 'When financing vater pollution control
systems,

In fact, 'When considering this economic solution, it becomes

apparent that p·~rhaps no more equitable method of cost allocation
could be devised,

What could be fairer than those 'Who benefit from

the polluting use pay for cost of their polluting use?
Many of the cost allocation theories earlier discussed already
demolls~tl'll.~f! .in .s.ome~degree a preference for .Placing the burden of
financing vaste water treatment on polluting users,

Theories of cost

assessment that seek to distinguish between users and non-users on the
basis of classifications 'Which separate, for instance, storm and

infil-

tration vater from user sewerage per se, are in this respect drawing
reasonable distinctions in allocating costs,

Often such theories of

cost assessment (relative use; capital and operation, etc,) rightly
finance operations on the basis of both property taxes and user
charges,

Sewer connection and tap fees also correctly attempt assess-

ment financing 'When functionally related to actual fixed as opposed
to operating costs.

All of these functional distinctions attempt in

various ways, though some more successfully than others, to assess the
cost of water treatment on the basis of benefits to polluting users.
User charge financing schemes also fall, at least conceptually,
into this particular cost allocating category.

User charges, however,

in most cases fail to functionally correlate the "cost of the polluting
use" with the "amount of the charge" levied on the polluting user.
The "flat rate" user charge scheme for instance exhibits little
functional correlation since it is based solely on a percentage of the
total amount of water used rather than on the actual clean up cost of
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polluting use.

It thus considers only one of the several factors

that determine the cost of polluting use.

Moreover. the sole factor

of "water quantity" that it considers may often be of minor importance in the actual polluting use cost calculation.
The "modified flat rate" user charge scheme embodied in the
"public utility" theory of cost assessment suffers to a leBBor extent
from this same deficiency.

Like the "flat rate" scheme it places

direct responsibility on the users of water but goes further in calculating rate charges by classifying users into general and thus disfunctional categories.

It fails because it bases its rate charges on

broad classes of users instead of specific types of polluting uses.
Along these same lines. cost assessment theories that place
the burden of financing waste water treatment on either federal. state.
or local general revenue appropriations are highly inequitable since
no attempt is even made to correlate pollution costs and polluting
uses.

Both the "diffused benefits" and "differential benefits"

theories of financing fall into this category.
Needed is a financing scheme that embodies reasonable user
non-user distinctions and in addition employs a user charge that
functionally relates charge rates to actual cost of polluting use.
Such a financing arrangement would seem to be the best of all possible
worlds.

It would be functionally satisfying from the standpoint of

both economics nnd equity.

Effluent Charge Financing

The effluent charge financing concept has been discribed ..
a levy on a party for using the environment by discharging
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an effluent into it, and depriving someone else of
the use he would like to make of the environment.
While the concept is sometimes called an effluent
tax, or an emission. tax, this nomenclature is not
strictly correct. A tax is a general charge with
no immediate quid pro quo for the payer; thus there
is a talC on tobacco and on income. A charge by the
post office or for grazing on government land is
another thing, however. It is 3 fee for a service
rendered or a damage sustained. 9
Administration and implementation of such a aystem is far
from a simple task.

However, the major problem encountered is also

- - its greatest benefi t--«Ietermining the cost of~poll.utiori and what it
is worth at different stages of use and to ...tiom based on a theory of
cost-benefit analysis.

This problem though, for the most part, has

been overcome by scientifically establishing complex pollution cost
indices

that are functionally correlated to waste discharges by

polluters.90 Another difficulty arises in attempting to impose
such a system upon a legal structure based on faulty assumptions as
to the nature of water.

Water use classification is often determined

by the status of the user (ie. whether the rightholder is a "riparian"
user or "appropriations" user), or by classification of the water
itself (ie. whether the water is "ground water" or "surface water"),
or on the basis of other artificial distinctions.9 1 Moreover, water
pollution control laws do not always take account of the "rights"
embodied in these legal classifications.
89nite, supra at 109-10.
90see Kneese and Bower, supra.
9lMorse, supra at 170.
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Despite the nicities of legal

categories, nature insists on floving its own course,

The result

is often inconsistency in statutory construction and unavoidable
conflict in environmental administration and enforcement,

A func-

tional water quality control and management system must transcend
convenient legal distinctions that are not in accord vith reality,
It must include all water sources and water users,

Application of

effluent charge financing is not restricted vithin the confines of
current legal terminology,

It assumes no "right to pollute" and

levies a charge on "all" polluting uses,
The various economic, administrative, and procdural aspects
of the effluent charge have been discussed at length elsewhere.

92

For the purposes of this article it is sufficient to note that the
system has had much success in Germany's Ruhr valley,93

This system

known as the Genossenschaften consists of eight regional associations
which operate a waste disposal system and water supply,

It distributes

the cost of water quality operations by levying charges on the effluents
discharged in each region,

Although a number of side calculations ate

made, in principle, costs are distributed in proportion to aggre-

'*

gate dilution requirements established by a central coordinating body, 9
The system is based on the principle that costs should be borne both by
members who are responsible for the effluent discharges and by those
9 '.?Kneese and Bower, supra at 1'*3-79,
9 3see Fair, Pollution Abatement in the Ruhr District, in
Comparison in Resource Management 152 (H, Jarret ed, 1961),
9\iorse, supra at 172,
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who benefit f-,,om the use of the "W&t-'r.

Th;, system also includes

strict regulatory supervision by the state.

Although the Ruhr river

is the sewer for one of the world's most concentrated industrial areas
(the Ruhr valley contains 40 percent of German industry, including 80
percent of coal, iron, steel, and heavy chemical capacity) 9 5 and the
river itself is small, with a low flow of less than half the flow on
the Potomac near Washington, 96 people fish and swim in the Ruhr river;
yet, the volume of wastes is extremely large--actually exceeding the
flow of the river itself in the dry season. 97 No doubt much cf tbis
system's success is attributable to its comprehensive regional orientation.

It also employs both qualitJ and quantity control methods

including collective waste treatment plants, use of certain streams for
waste-effluent carriage, diversion of stream flow to promote purity and
enhance waste sterilization, and use of artificial recharge of underground aquifers. 98
This system necessarily ignores straight marginal cost pricing
in favor of a charge that provides an incentive to preserve scar~e
resources.9 9 The effluent charge thus levied serves two purposes:
(1) it acts as an equitable means of assessing the cost and distiibuting
95auff, supra at 84.
96 Ibid.
97Ibid.
98iJanks, Eleary and Kneese, Develo ent of a Water i)uclity
Mana ement Pro ram for the Delaware River Basin 10 1963Tlreport to
the Delaware River Basin Commission.
99Morse, supra at 174.
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the benefits of the regulation and treatment of stream 1n1ters, and
(2) it provides an incentive to polluters to reduce waste loads through
process adjustment, recovery practices and pretreatment since it internalizes cost.
The American experience with the effluent charge concept has
so far been extremely limited, though California, 100 and more recently
101
Vermont
have used various aspects of the effluent charge concept in
their respective water pollution control and management systems and the
Delaware River Basin Compact 102 on the Eastern Seaboard embodies this
"regional" approach to comprehensive planning and control.
In summary, it should be noted that the effluent charge concept
provides both the "economic" solution to pollution and a cost assessment equitably acceptable to most users.

Furthel'l!lore, it is capable of

producing revenue adequate to meet a water quality control and management system's operational needs.

The effluent charge accomplishes

this by directly and functionally relating the cost of the user charge
to the actual cost of polluting use.
Various proposals have been put forth for the adoption of some
fonn of effluent charge system in the United States.l03 With the
passage of the Federal Wate~ Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 104

lOOibid. at 174-77.
lOlibid.
l0 2Ibid.
l03See Grady, "Effluent Charges and the Industrial Water Pollution Problem", 5 New Eng. L. Rev. 61 (1969).
104Pub. L. No. 92-500 ( Oct. 18, 1972).
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the op.,ortU11i iy read11 3 pre sen-.. its elf for the states to adopt
the effluent charge as part of a total water control system corresponding with the present system of sewer and municipal waste charges.l05
Water treatment districts would be the conduits for monies that relate
to costs of use and benefit to municipal facilities and residents.

106

The state as a central coordinating and managing authority wo~ld act
as the next level of collection and distribution with power to admin1 07 "
. t er-sure harges, a dded . 1 evies,
.
f.1nes, .. anu.-.1ncen
~ ·
t 1ve_p
·
1ana~-1>1:ven
_. ___ is
__ _

sufficient technological competence, such a comprehensive system would
be able to enforce mandatory regulations, determine the amount of
effluents

a particular user was adding to the water supply, and

encourage and assist users in improving techniques for pretreatment
and reduction of waste loads.

108

The Kentucky Case

The Kentucky legislature in 1972 in order to comply with
Federal regulations concerning the operation of sewerage treatment
facilities and in order to provide an agency to generate funds for this
purpose, created the Kentucky Pollution Abatement Authority.l09

105See Morse, supra.
l0 6Ibid, at 188,
l0 7Ibid.
lOSibid.
l0 9K.U.S. ch. 221<A,
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In

complying with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 this state agency was created in order that it might regulate
the construction of sewerage treatment facilities, generate funds in
order to procure matching federal grants, and enter into financing
contracts with local water districts.

The main features of the

Authority are its talr:ing and regulatory powers.
The Authority as created is a public corporation and a goveI'Dlllental- agency -that -is to act as an instrumental-i-ty--of--the-s-ta-te- ----~of Kentucky.

110

The affairs of the agency are managed by a board of

five members, 'Who serve without compensation for four years, appointed
by the governor of the state.
These five appointees are the governing board of the Authority
and are relatively autonomous though for administrative purposes the
Authority is directed "to establish and maintain offices" in "the
appropriate and responsible state department."

The Authority is thus

attached to the "state water pollution agency" 'Which is defined by law
as the Kentucky Water Pollution Control Commission of the Department
of Heal th.

111

The Authority is given power to make state grants as fr.nds are
available to any "governmental agency," and to assist the agency ih
construction of waste water treatment works, 'Which will constitute and
be eligible projects for state-federal assistance. 112

This section of

llOK.R.S. ch. 224A.OJO.
111

Ibid. 224A.010. See, Senate Bill 112, 1974 G<eneral Assed,ly,
effective June 21, 1974, discussed supra.
112Ibid. 2241\.040.
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the Act states that it is the purpose of the agency to "m&Iimize the
total amounts of federal grant participation received for all eligible
projects inatituted by governmental agenciea within the co1111110nvealth ·of
Kentucky." 113
The power to levy tu:es is also conferred to the Authority.

The

Authority is declared to be an independent taxing district 1ilhose
district encompasses the entire geographical area of the conmonvealth
of Kentucky. Such broad authority is based on the fact that its objectives serve "a statewide purpose not related to any specific area or
locality of the state ••• but affecting the welfare and health of all
114
Kentucky citizens ••• both functionally and economically.
The
Authority, upon resolution of its governing body, may levy and collect
a tu: upon every purchase of water service in the co1111110nweal th of Kentucky, "such tax to be equal to not more than two percent (2:,;) of the
gross amount of each purchase of water service."

115 Tax receipts

constitute Authority revenues and can be used to carry out the purpose•
for 'Which the Authority is created (matching state funds) but also
can be used for the purpose of payment of principal and interest on
Authority revenue bonds.
Thus, by way of this

2:,;

tax on water service, the legislature

intended to give the Authority power to raise matching State funds in
order to participate in the Federal grant-in-aid program.
113Ibi d.

114 Ibid •. 22~.Q6o.
H 5Ib i ..!!.:_
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But there

are other avenues open for generating state fund• available to the
Authority.

Namely the issuance of revenue bonds by the Authority,

116

the issuance of general state obligation bonds to generate revenue
for the Authority subject to voter approval, 117 direct appropriations
from the state legislature, and the transmittal of sewer charges to
the Authority from local governml!ltal agencies operating sewerage
treatment facilities as agreed on in "assistance agreements" between
the Authority and local governmental agencies in connection with
"eligible projects."
The Authority, it can be seen, has access to the following
sources of revenue:

appropriations from the state legislature to the

118

119
issuance of Authority revenue bonds;
issuance of
120
general state obligation bonds;
remittal of sewerage charges from

Authority;

local governmental agencies in eligible projects as stipulated in
"assistance agreements" between the Authority and local governmental
121
agencies operating eligible projects;
power to levy statewide 2%
_.__ on wa t er service.
.
122 Thus the Authority has the option of
t,GA.

issuing revenue bonds or levying the 2% statewide water service tax
116

Ibid. 22u.120.

117Ibid. 22u.220.
118

Ibid. 22u.050.

119Ibid. 224A.120.
120ibid.
224A.220.
121

Ibid. 22u.190.

122 Ibid,

224A.060.

to raise revenue to natch federal funds.

After this money is raised

on the state level by the Authority and federal grants are procured,
the Authority may distribute this money to local governmental agencies
involved in eligible sewerage treatment projects.

These state grants

to the local governml!ltal agencies are, though, only loans which must

123 as to the aggregate principal amount of

be repaid to the Authority

the state grant plus interest on the aggregate balance of the principal
_8.lllount_fro_m !ime to t~me remaining unpaid, computed at the applicable
interest rate, plus 1/4 of 1%.

124

In order to pay back these state

grants, local governmental agencies are empowered to enter into "assistance agreements" with the state authority and to covenant with the
Authority to impose service charges upon all persons to whom sewer
services are provided by the construction of eligible projects.
These charges may be "in addition

12

5

to all other rates and rentals,

and charges of a similar nature now or hereafter authorized by law and
now or hereafter being levied and collected by such governmental
agencies."

Thus the local governmental agencies may impose service

charges to repay state grants.

Indeed the State Pollution Abatement

Authority can require the imposition of sewerage charges through
stipulation of these charges in "assistance agreements."

126 The

Authority is specifically authorized in the event any governmental

.

1231hid.

221.a.10o(s)(a)(b) •

125Ibid. 224A,080(5)(7).
126Ibid. 224A.070 (7); 224A.100(10).
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agency 'llhich is a party to an assistance agreement fails to perform
its duties in the assistance agreement, to directly impose sewerage
charges in the Authority's name. 127 Both the local governmental
agencies and the state authority have the power to compel local
water users that could reasonably be served by the eligible project
.
128 ·
to join the proJect.
The Authority also has the power to compel the
local governmental agencies to adjust their service charges to meet
12
the requirements of an assistance agreement. 9 Finally, assistance
agreements.. may provide. by their terms. that service..chargee .levied by
local governmental agenciee for payment to the Authority be reduced,
diminiehed, or extinguished to the extent that the Authority has,
during any fiscal period of the Authority, levied and collected
water utility taxes pureuant to its power to tax as an independent
statewide taxing district. 130

Such reduction, diminution or extinguish-

ment of local service charges to be based upon formulas, procedures and
other rules and regulations 'llhich shall be prescribed by the Authority.
This then is the basic legal and administrative structural
setting of the state machinery created by Kentucky law to comply with
Federal regulations in this area.

As discussed earlier, the Kentucky

Pollution Abatement Authority has several alternative and possible
resources of revenue in order to generate funds to enable it to enter
assistance agreements with local government agencies for eligible
127Ibid. 224A.1BO.
128Ibid. 224A.1B0(2).
129 Ibid. 224A.190.
iJOlbid. 224A.200.
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projects.

What must be kept in mh,d is that stE.te grants raised

from these revenue.-sources and distributed to local governmcnul
agencies must be repaid in full with interest.
Now, and this needs to be underlined, if the costs of sewerage
treatment grants are to be related economically and functionally to
pollution sources the source of the state Authority's revenue for
grants must be conaidered.

If the revenue comes largely from legislative

appro11rie.~ions the equities of cost diatribut_io11 depend obviously on
the existing general tax policy in Kentucky.

The raising of revenue

via general obligation bonds seems politically infeasible in light of
the fact that the issuance of the&e bonds would require voter approval
and this provision was probably included as only an emergency source
of funds.

The issuance of Authority revenue bonds shifts the cost

distribution to the local memebers of the eligible sewerage treatment
projects to the extent that

revenue from legislative appropriations

are not used to pay interest and principal and are not calculated to
be repaid by the local governmental agencies in the assistance agreements.

Thus, if Authority revenue bonds are used as the primary source

of revenue the equity of cost distribution would depend upon the equitiea
inherent in the local governmental agencies revenue raising scheae, which
this paper will look at shortly.

However, if the Authority uses its

power as an independent taxing district and levies a 2% straightline
water service tax statewide, the cost distribution would be grossly
unequitable.

Although the Act creating the Kentucky Pollution Abate-

ment Authority states that the Auth1rrity has this broad po.rer since
the purpose of the tax is a statewide purpose and benefits

00

particlllur

geographical area, the actual result would be just the opposite.
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Tl::at

ia, there is not only an inherent inequity in taxing all polluters
alike (2~ tax statewide), but since local governmental water treatment diatrict revenue schemes vary greatly, there is a likelihood
that the costs of operating treatment facilities would not be uniform
a1 between members of different sewerage treatment districts in
eligible projects; not to mention people in water treatment districts
not engaged in eligible projects.

Moreover, since a good percentage

of operating revenue for treatment facilities comes directly out of
the local government's general revenue fund, equities in paying back
state graBts to the Authority will vary to the extent that tax policies
of local governmental units vary.
The Act creating the financing scheme of the Kentucky Pollution
Abatement Authority did not provide for redressing inequities produced
between citizens in eligible projects and those in non-participating
projects (those not receiving state grants through assistance agreements).
On the contrary, it provided that service charges levied by local governmental agencies for payment to the state authority "may be reduced,
diminished, or extinguished" to the extent that the Authority has levied
its 2% statewide tax. Exact computation of the amount of the reduction
would probably depend on the amount of revenue raised by this
from the particular district:

2%

tax

such reduction being computed through

adoption hy the state authority of rules, formulas, and regulations
for this purpose.

In light of the varying revenue raising schemes

employed by local water treatment districts and considering the variation in the overall taxing policy of local governmental uni ts vhoae
general nvenucs support such districts it is almost impossible to

conceive of a formula or rule that would eliminate the resulting
inequities inherent in the Authority's present financing scheme.

How-

ever, both inequities in cost distribution and the failure to internalize costs can be eliminated by the use of the effluent charge at either
the state or local levels.

A Statewide Effluent Charge

A statewide effluent charge would replace the 2~ tax levy on
water service statewide.

It would maintain a statewide uniform scale

for raising revenue (charging according to type of use and cost of
treatment) while at the same time make the tax relate to the functional and economic realities of the purpose of this statewide charge,
thus reducing the inequity of a

non-functional straightline 2~ tax.

This all could be done by a simple amendment.

A Local Effluent Charge

The State Pollution Abatement Authority bas the power to
stipulate sewer service charges imposed by local governmental agencies
in its assistance agreements with local agencies for eligible projects.
Thus, the same uniform and functional scale for raising rev~nue and
distributing costs as would be imposed at the state level by the
Authority would also be.imposed in the eligible project districts by
the local gover1::nental agencies.

Thus an equitable determination of

the amount that local Yervice charges would be reduced when the state-
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wide charge is levied would be facilitated as would the equitable
coat distribution between eligible project members themselves,
Moreover, this local effluent charge could be implemented now under
existing law,

Furthermore, the Authority's 2~ statO¥ide tax certainly

does not attempt to functionally internalize the cost of pollution,
Water pollution control and management systems that may have
been adequate in the past will cetainly not solve today's,imch less
tomorrow's, problems,

The only real solution to the water pollution
- - - -- -

problem lies in a

- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

functional program of total water control rather

than simply piecemeal attacks,

The effluent charge concept resolves

the economic problem of pollution and fairly distributes the social
cost of pollution,

State water pollution control administrative

structures are now in their infancy,

It is hoped that state imple-

mentation of this country's water resource goals will not abort the
positive action that has already been taken,

C.

STATE AND INTERSTATE
PARTICIPATION IN NPDES

It has been stated and illustrated that Kentucky has the
ability under existing legislative authority to undertake the
regulatory actions necessary to implement an effluent tax on a
statewide basis.

However the larger issue in this

study is

whether an effluent tax can be levied by Kentucky as a part of an
-

--- - - - --

----

interstate compact in its role as a member of ORSANCO affect1ng tlie

Ohio River Basin.

First to restate what has been set forth in the

Study Reports to 0,W.R.R. upon which this report is based, Kentucky
is a member of an interstate compact affecting the Ohio River Basin,
and a statewide authority exists for the implementation of this and
131
other compacts. The mechanism is, therefore, available.
What should be emphasized is that the 1972 FWPCA AMENDMENTS
require the states to implement both a charge on industrial users
of sewerage facilities financed under federal funds and to initiate
a state permit system as a part of the National Pollution Discharge
. . t'1on Sys t em (NPDES), 132
El 1m1na

Failure to

act in the former instance

will cause loss of federal funds and in the latter, federal regulation.
The states may consider themselves better able to create and operate
a pollution permit system or, if not more able, at least more cognizant
of the needs of their citizens.

In any case, the federal water pollution

131 K,R.S, 224.190; K,R.S. 224.195; K.R.S. 224.205,
13 2.Fl,'PCA 1972 Amendments 204(b) and 402(b)(9) (P.L. 92-500,
Oct. 18, 1972,)

control acts have consistently taken the position that state action
is primary, and the incorporation of the Federal Refuse Act of 1899
into the Water Pollution Control Act has maintained state primacy
1
in the area of pollution permits. 33
Read together, the 1972 amendments require both user charges
and a pollution permit system.

It would appear that user charges can

be incorporated into a pollution permit system to serve as both a

_~I"C_!lll:t]:!__ Oil_ the_ polluter and as an incentive to achieve a state of
non-discharge.

It should be emphasized at this point that NPDES

avoids the stigma of being a "tax to pollute" by creating time limits
on permits as well as by being part of a larger, no-discharge water
pollution control act.

Permits are issued only after a determination of

minimal or base effluent discharge limitations and as a part of a
1 4
continuing program to eliminate effluent discharges. 3

The pollution

l33FWPCA Sec. 101(b) "It is the policy of Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States
to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and
use (including restoration, preservation, and enforcement) of land and
water resources and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of
his authority under this Act." Sec. 402{a){5) 11 • • • The Administrator shall
authorize a State, which he determines has the capability of administering
a permit program which will carry out the objective of this Act, to issue
permits for discharges into the navigable waters within the jurisdiction
of such State."
4
l3 Ibid., {b) "The Administrator shall approve each such submitted
program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist: (1)
To issue permits which--{a) apply, and insure compliance with, any
applicable requirements of sections 301, 302, 306, 307, and 403; (b) are
for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and {c) can be terminated or
modified for cause, including but not limited to the following: {i) violation of any condition of the permit; (ii) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or failure to disclose fully all rele1VaDt facts; (iii)
change in any condition that requires either a eemporary or permanent
reduction or elimination of this permitted discharge; ••• "
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tax envisaged is one that would create an incentive for the polluter
to achieve a least-cost solution to the pollution problem, whether it
would be installation of pollution control equipment, joining an areawide or regional control system, or shutting down cper•tiona altogether.

135

The tax is expected to work as an incentive to achieve the most econmic solution.

Whether or not a regulatory agency such as the water

control authority should use the tax systec in order to achieve zeropollution is beyond the scope of this study.
out that using

It is necessary to point

the tax system for other than revenue purposes creates

problems of oversight and misuse of the tax dollar.

Moreover allowing

the pollution control agency to act as the collector and user of such
taxes would encourage a high tax rate not designed to achieve least cost
methods of pollution control.
The pollution tax or user charge is a second best answer designed
to answer the problems of too little information available to set proper
regulatory standards on effluent limitations.

In a permit system, the

l35see, Surrey, Stanle~ S., Pathways to Tax Reform. (Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard U. Press, 1973} vho created the concept of tax expenditures
as a means of describing "governmental financial assistance given
through the tax system rather than through the direct methods of the
regular budget, ••• " (p.vii). "As an example of 'What is meant by
'least-cost abatement,' suppose two polluters, A and B, each emit
100 pounds of pollutants. It costs A 50 cents to eliminate one pound
of pollution, but costs B $1 a pound. If each eliminates 50 pounds
of pollutants, then total pollution is reduced by 100 pounds. The
total cost of abatement is $75• Clearly a cheaper way to eliminate
100 pounds of pollutants wpuld be to have A stop polluting entirely,
'While B does not abate al all. Then 100 pounds of total abatement
costs only $50." ••• "Pollutbn uxes lead to~east-cost abatement in th~
following manner: Assume the pollution ta'.: is set at 50 cents a pow,d.
If a polluter can eliminate a pound of pollutants from his emissions
for less tb:ln 50cents, he will save money by doing so rather than paying
the tax. Therefore a polluter will eliminate as many pounds of pollutants from his emissions as he can, so long as the cost of abatement
is less than 50 cents a pound." )p.156-7)

tax create• an incentive to achieve leaat-coat effective methods
of pollution control,

This ans-wer assumes that the most efficient

point discharge limitations are not known, or that technological
ability to control pollution is not available, and that society is
UDYilling to give up the products created by the polluter,

136

Both the permit system and the effluent tax can be part of a
larger aystem operating on a state or an interstate basis,

The 1972

FWPCA amendments require a user charge and state participation in the
- - ------- - - - ---------

--

-

-

- - - - ---

----- -

-- -

-

-

--

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, and the Water Pollution
Control Act provides explicity for interstate agreements in the water
1 36Ibid,, at 156-7, "If the desired solution to the pollution
problem is to eliminate all emissions of pollutants, then a least-coat
abatement--and a pollution tax--approach is not the appropriate path,
Clearly, regulation of a prohibitory character is the necessary techniques,,,,many economists consider such an approach [elimination by
1985 of the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters under the
1972 FWPCA] likely in the end to prove unfeasible except in rather
special situations, They believe the costs of total elimination may
be out of proportion to the benefits attained, and hence larger than
the nation will desire to pay," Surrey discusses the problems involved
in using the tax system for any reason other than revenue purposes,
A particular disadvantage is the burden using tax policy for regulatory
purposes places upon legislative committees unfamiliar with the problems
involved therein, e.g. Tax Committees as opposed to Public Works or
Commerce Committees, Administration of the tax is another problem,
Should E,P,A. maintain primary authority? Moreover, if the charge were
viewed as a regulatory tax, then 1 would be deductible, whereas a regulatory
fine is not deductible in computing net income. Therefore the user
charge can operate like a subsidy in that it benefits the rich more than
the poor. The pollution tax or user charge must be viewed as a part of
a multi-faceted approach, Any form of pollution control expenditure
by an industrial user will have tax consequences, and the important
point is that policy makers should be aware of this fact.when setting
levels of charges or determining the advisalility of subsidy versus user
charge, The choice between regulation versus user charges involves a
different problem, that of technological feasibility and desired level
of pollution control, and, in fact, a pollution control system should
both include regulation and user charges, See, also, McDaniel, Paul R.
and Kaplinsky, Allan S,, "The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to
Combat Air and \later Pollution: A Case in Tax Expenditures," 12 Boston
College Indllstrial and Commercial Law Review 351 (1970-1971).
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quality control area. 137
ORSANCO is the interstate compact authority for the Ohio River
Basin, and Kentucky is one of the members of this interstate compact. 138
In the past, ORSANCO has operated on a low level of enforcement with a
1
high level of technological cooperation and co11111UDity visibility. 39
The interstate compact may eventually give way to area-wide and basin
solutions insofar as natural resources are concerned; however, interstate
mechanisms do exist and contain a politically acceptable and constitutional means of dealing with political problems that involve interstate
.

re 1a t 1.ons.

1i.o

lJ?P.L. 92-500, FWPCA 1972 Amendments provide in Sec. 10J(a)
"The administra•or shall encourage cooperative activities by States
for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, encourage
the enactment of improved and, so far as practicable, uniform State
laws relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution;
and encourage compacts between States for the prevention and control
of pollution. (b) The consent of the Congress is hereby given to two
or more States to negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts, not
in conflict wi:th any law or treaty of the United States, for (1) cooperative effort and mutual assistance for the prevention and control
of pollution and the enforcement of their respective laws ·relating
thereto, and (2) the establishment of such agencies, joint orctherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such agreements
and compacts. No such agreement or compact shall be binding or obligatory upon any state a party thereto unless and until it has been approved
by the Congress. See,
.
the Interstate
Imvironment Compact, S. Bill 907, 92nd Congress. 2nd Session, Jan. 2i.,
1972, a bill providing for Congressional preconsent to supplemental
agreements by states.
This report takes the position
that Congressional oversight and approval of ~atters of national concern
is necessary. The use of federal-interstate compacts and of unif•rm
state lawn is a more acceptable solution -where the need for uniformity
and the utilization of scarce resources are at issue.
1-3
) Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact [c.581, Stat. 752 (19i.o)
and K.R.S. 224.190]
lJ9Cleary, Edward J., The ORSANCO Story: Water Quality Management in the Ohio Valley Under An Interstate Compact. (Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).
140Barton, Weldon V., Interstate Compacts in the Political
Process, (Chapel Hill, N.C., U. of North Carolina Press, 1967); Grad,
Frank P., "Federal St.ate Compact--A New Experim~nt in Cooperative Feder-al ism."
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ORSANCO consists of three co11111issioners from each member state
and three coamissoners representing the federal government •. The signatories have agreed to cooperate in the abatement of existing pollution
and in the control of future pollution in the Ohio River Basin and, "to
enact any necessary legislation to enable each ••• state to place and maintain the waters of said basin in a satisfactory sanitary condition,
available for safe and satisfactory use as public and industrial water
_____________ supplies after reasonable treatment, stttable for recreational usage,
Capable of maintaining fish and other aquatic life, free from unsightly
or malordorus nuisances die to floating solids or sludge deposits, and
4
adaptable to such other uses as :nay be legitimate • .,l l The real problem
of ORSANCO has been its lack of enforcement capacity in that member
.
. own b orders. 142
s tates mus t agree t o en f orcemen t ac t ions
wi"th"in their
This problem has been made less serious, however, by recent court decisions
on the federal common law applicable to actions involving the pollution
of interstate waters.

Moreover the federal governnmet would have enforce-

ment powers under the NPDES 'Whether or not the states cooperated in an
interstate permit system under the umbrella of ORSANCo. 143
63 Colum. L. Rev. 825 (1963).
141
142

ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Article I.
Ibid., Article IX.

1

'*3In Illinois vs. City of Milwaukee, 402 U.S. 91 (1972) the
Supreme Court held that plaintiff state had a cause of action under
federal common law to enjoin the pollution of interstate ~aters by
governmeutal parties. A federal district court in United States vs.
U.S. Steel Corp., 356 ~'. Supp. 556 (N.D. Il.l.. 1973) extended this rale
to cases 'Where the defendant was a non-governmental body and the plaintiff was the United States. The 1972 FWPCA provides for federal enforcement of state permits programs in Sec. 309.
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This report suggests that ORSANCO can be used, within the
authority provided by Atticle I thereof, to implement an interstate
permit system containing an effluent or user charge to be placed on
all polluters.

All of the states in ORSANCO now have a pollution

control program that includes,·.·to some degree, a permit program.

They

vary from highly developed statutory programs in Illinois and New York
to regulations implemented under the general authority of a water
144
pollution statute such as in Kentucky.
The Council of State Governments has developed a "Model Law
to Enable States to Participate in the National Discharge Pollutant
Elimination System Established Under the 1972 Federal Water Vollution
Cnntrol Act. 11

It is suggested that Kentucky and those states in the

Ohio River Basin that do not have comprehensive statutory provisions
that llOUld allow entry into the NDPES should adopt this Hodel.

The

states in ORSANCO could then implement the NDPES on an interstate basis,
14
insofar as certain elements of the program may allow for joint action. 5
14

,."To adopt, after hearing, such general rules and regulations
pertaining to the prevention, abatement and control of existing or
proposed pollution as the coll!lllisuion may deem necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes of K.R,S. 22i.,.010 to 224,060, 224.080 or
22i.,,100." Kentucky Water Pollution Control Commission Regulation WP-1,
Permits to Discharge Sewage, Industrial Wastes or Other·wastes, adipted
January 8, 1957; Kentucky Public Hearings Regulations WP-2, adopted
Hay 16, 1961;Kentucky Water Quality Standards Regulation WP-4-1, adopted
August 22, 1971, were enacted under the authority of R.R.S. 224.0J.,O.
Arnold, Thomas B., "Effluent Limitations and NPDES: Federal and State
Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972," 15 Boston Coll. Industrial and Commercial L, R0 v. 767, 776,
lists several states which have either enacted statutes or passed regulations implementing the NPDES program.
ii.,5.,A Model Lav to Enable States to Participate in the National
Discharge Pollutant Elimination System Established Under the 1972 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. 11
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Kentucky water pollution control law has utilized the regulatory
process to implement the generalized prohibitions and requirements of
K.R.S. 224 et. seq. Regulations WP-1, Permits to Discharge Sewage·;
Industrial Wastes, or Other Wastes (Adopted January 8, 1957) is the
existing permit regulations; it does not fulfill the industrial user
requirement of &ection 402 of the 1972 FWCPA; however, revision of the
regulation will be more efficient than legislative action, and it has
__ _ _ _ _____ _______h_e_en stat.._4 tha_t the act requires only that a plan be submitted by the
state and that the E.P.A. administrator assure that enforcement authority
Hists in the state to implement the permit program.

In fact, -the E.P.A.

has approved state permit programs that were not yet fully realized in
regulation or legislation.

146

Kentucky has the legislative and regulatory framework to provide
the necessary enforcement procedures, and, as discussed above, the legislative framework for user charges has been created by the legislation
and needs only to be implemented on a statewide basis.

147

The major

146See, Arnold, Thomas B., +upra. at p. 775. The author takes
the position that statutory implementation is a necessity; however, the
E.P.A. regulations indicate that regulatory implementation is sufficient.
Whether or not statutory implementation is a better way of preserving the
political process is another question; however, the public hearing procedure provides public participation, and sullsequent legislatur,,s, as well
as the judiciary have the ability to revise regulatory actions. ,.See,
40 C.F.R. 124; 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, Dec. 22 1 1972, as amende,l 1,y 38 Fed.
Reg. 17999, July 5, 1973, and 38 Fed. Reg. 19894, July 24, 1973.)
147See, Text, at notes 109-130, supra.
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problem has been and remains rationalizing the multitude of programs
that now exist under different statutory authorities.

148

The 1974 Kentucky legislature enacted Senate Bill 112, "An Act
Relating to the reorganization of State Government."

Article III of

that Act, "Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection,"
revises K.R.S. Chapter 224 to a great extent and is the beginning of a
needed restructuring of Kentucky natural resources administration.
- - - -- -- -

It

--ts-as-yet-too-early-to-predic-t-the-ef-fect-of-the-New_Legisla:tioJl_OJl~-the future of water quality control financing and a permit system; however, the reorganization goes a long way to create the needed framework
for rationalization of the Kentucky framework.
Section 1 of the Act amends K.R.·S. 11.060 to create program
cabinet secre'8ries in the Office of the Governor who will constitute
the governor's general cabinet.

K.R.S. 12.020 is repealed, amended, and

reenacted to create cabinet departments, which include, '.'3.
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.

(a)

Department

Environmental

Quality Connnission. (b) Soil and Water Conservation Connnission. (c)
Ohio River Sanitation Commission. 11149
Section 2 of the Act creates a Bureau for Land Resources and a
Bureau for Environmental Quality within the Department, each headed by
148

See, Kentucky. Department of Natural Resources. Kentucky
Framework 'i'Tater Plan, p. 29-40, for a listing of the various statutes
and agencies dealing with water.
14

9Baldwin's Kentucky Rev. Stat. and Rules Service • .!21i
.;.::::c~~"-~I~ss~u~e~. Acts of 1974 Regular Session of the Kentucky General
Cleveland, Ohio, Banks-Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 1974.) at

;
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a Commissioner appointed by the Secretary of the Department for Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection.

The Secretary is the successor
1
office to the Conmissioner of Natural Resources. 50
Section 10 established a new section of K.R.S. 224 that will
transfer all corporate bodies, advisory connnittees, interstate compacts,
or other statutory bodies now attached to the functions in whole or in
part to the Department of Natural Resources or the Department of Envir-

__________ onmnetaLPro_tec:tion_to_the_S_e_cretacy_, __wh_o__wi_l_l then assume all memberships and duties and the successor office, including that of Kentucky
1 1

representative for the receipt of federal funds. 5

Section 13 revises all prior sections of Kentucky Revised
Statutes to coordinate the functions of predecessor offices under the
new department.
1. "Department of Natural Resources" to "Department
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection", and
specifically the Reviser of Statutes shall make such changes
-when such language appears in KilS Chapters 146, 149 and 151.

2. "Department of Environmental Protection" to "Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection",
and specifically the Reviser of Statutes shall nake such
changes when such language appears in KilS Chapters 109,
224,235 and 350.
3.

"Division" to "Department".

"Director 11 to "Secretary"

and "Division of Forestry" to "Department for Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection" when such language appears in KilS Chapter 149.

•

4. "Division" to "Department" and "Director" to
"Secretary for Natural Re!lllrces and Environmental
Protectfon" -when such language appears in KRS Chapter 151 •

150lbj d.' at P• 51.
151 Ibid,,

at p. 52.

a
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5, Delete subsection (3) of KRS 151,100 and renumber all follcwinr subsection~.
6, "Lepa1·tment of H~al th" to "Department for JJaturol
Resot•"."ces and Environmental Protection" when such language appears in IffiS 231,. 321.

7, "Division" to "Department" and "Division of
Reclamation" to "Department for Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection" 'When such language appears
in KRS Chapter 350,
8. "Department of Environmental Protection" to
"Bureau for Heal th Services" in KRS 221,,223 to
224.237 and "K.D.E.P." to "K •• B.H.S." in KRS 224.230,
9~etlevfiior of~S'fatutes shall rnak<e any other
statutory reference changes necessary to effect the
intent of this Act, including the renumbering or relocation of Sections 146,080, 146.090, 146.100 and
11,6,110 in KRS Chapter 262.
Section 14, Sections 146.010, 146,020, 146,025,
11,6.050, 146.120, 151,130 and 224.031 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes are hereby repealed,

'·
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